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Introduction
Financial liberalization and integration have not worked out as advertised and have
generated disappointing results.  They were supposed to set up a win-win situation:
Capital would flow from capital-abundant, low-return, aging industrial countries to
capital-scarce, high-return, young emerging countries.  Growth in receiving countries
would accelerate, and both giver and receiver would be happier since everyone’s
diversification opportunities would be improved.  As a bonus, emerging-market
policymakers would be disciplined by losing access to a captive local financial market.
Instead, emerging markets have been rattled by financial turmoil, especially
during the past two to three 3 years.  Depending on one’s viewpoint as optimist or
pessimist, financial integration and globalization have either generated excessive
volatility or run amok.  In either event, political support for liberalizing policies is harder
to achieve, and the prospect of long-run growth has not compensated for these new
headaches.  While growth in Latin America has accelerated from 1 percent per year in the
1980s to some 4 percent in the 1990s, it has not reached the levels of the 1960s, when
capital flows were an order of magnitude smaller.
1  This perception is felt all the more
strongly these days as Latin America is undergoing its worst growth year since the early
1980s prompted by a sudden and large collapse in the volume of capital inflows. The
degree of financial volatility and the frequency of panics, crises, and contagion have
made the current state of affairs socially costly and politically disappointing in emerging
economies
By contrast, industrial countries, and especially the G-7, view the increasing
volume of financial rescue packages as a source of concern. Fearing that the current
strategy to deal with financial turmoil may involve a self-fulfilling explosion of their
quasi-fiscal liabilities to International Financial Institutions, they have reacted with an
agenda to scale back the magnitude of official support. As a result, reform of the
international financial architecture has become a booming industry.
What’s wrong with the world?  There is no shortage of  “solutions.”  Several
reports have been, are being, and will be produced by multilateral organizations, think
tanks, academics, and G-n task forces, with n taking values between 7 and 33.  But the
connection between proposed solutions and the problems that are important to solve is
not as well developed.  In fact, we would argue not only that the depth of the diagnosis is
shallow but also that the implicit diagnosis underlying many of the most popular
proposals is misleading.
This paper discusses different views about what is wrong with the world, or as an
economist would say, the principal distortions that are present.  The intent is to clarify the
logic behind the proposals for reforming the international financial architecture and
                                               
1 Rodrik (1998) finds no relation between capital account liberalization and growth.4
provide a means of assessing them.  (The actual assessment is performed in the
companion paper “Getting it Right: What to Reform in International Financial Markets,”
Fernández-Arias and Hausmann, 2000.)
An overview suggests that these different views can be classified into three
groups.  The first identifies the main financial problem as an excess of capital flows due
to moral hazard, which causes private returns to exceed social returns.  This generates too
much lending and distorts its allocation.
2  Proposed remedies involve limiting moral
hazard whenever possible and, as a fallback when this is not possible, discouraging
capital flows through sand-in-the-wheels policies.  One can think of this cluster of
viewpoints as “Theories of Too Much.”
The second alternative cluster of views, which we label “Theories of Too Little,”
posits that the fundamental problem comes from distortions that limit the enforcement of
cross-border contracts, which cause capital flows to be too small relative to certain
desirable benchmarks.  In turn, failures of enforcement lead to frequent crises.  Theories
under this heading would help explain a nagging puzzle in economic theory.  The
standard theory of international trade predicts that capital should move from capital-
abundant to capital-scarce countries and tend to equalize capital-labor ratios.  However,
after decades of capital mobility, capital-labor ratio differentials remain enormous and
there is scarcely any perceivable tendency toward equalization.  The volume of flows
observed, e.g., 5 percent of GDP in the recipient countries, appears small relative to what
would be required to achieve equalization in a reasonable time period.  This puzzle has
also appeared in a different context.  Feldstein and Horioka (1980) found that investment
is financed fundamentally by domestic savings in a manner inconsistent with the notion
of an integrated world capital market.
Finally, the third class of theories emphasizes the instability of financial market
conditions available to emerging markets and the unreliability of external finance to
support sustained development.  These are “Theories of Too Volatile,” which have
rapidly developed as a way of explaining recent crises and financial contagion.
According to this view, markets are prone to panic for no particular reason in such a way
that economies with strong fundamentals are constantly subject to the risk of massive
withdrawal of funds that, by bringing the economy to an unnecessary sudden stop, would
self-validate a crisis outcome.  Similarly, distortions in international financial markets
may lead to financial contagion and the interruption of the supply of capital to
creditworthy countries.  In the extreme, international financial integration may entail the
importation of too much instability to make it worthwhile
The three classes of theories outlined above emphasize different distortions but
are complementary in explaining crises.  For example, Theories of Too Volatile may be
valid irrespective of whether capital flows are too much or too little.  Similarly, Theories
of Too Much and Theories of Too Little are not mutually exclusive because they do not
start from the same benchmarks.  The former point out distortions that make the volume
                                               
2 Lack of transparency is often cited as a complementary distortion.5
of capital flows larger than they would otherwise be.  The latter point to distortions that
make them too small.  Hence, each theory takes all other distortions as given.
One key question is what would the world be like in the absence of significant
distortions.  If that best of all worlds is one of smaller flows, restricting capital
movements could be an effective shortcut.  If, instead, it involves a radically larger flow
of resources, then adopting policies that restrict the development of capital markets could
be very inefficient.  So the bottom line can be expected to depend on the relative
importance of the various distortions.  The emphasis on a particular set of theories in
justifying policy proposals needs to match their relative relevance in the diagnosis of the
problems of international financial markets in Latin America.
From a policy point of view, it is key to pose the issue of reforming the
international financial architecture as a second-best proposition, one in which reforms
will have to endure the existence of unavoidable distortions.  In such a setting, the
reduction of one particular distortion may very well be counterproductive and a single-
minded focus on one particular set of theories may be dangerously misleading. After all,
the theory of second best clearly shows that when there is more than one distortion in the
system the reduction of one is not necessarily welfare-improving. Specifically, the fight
against moral hazard may easily lead to an inferior situation.
This paper attempts to display a broad array of important distortions in the
international financial markets of emerging economies.  First, as explained above, the
second best nature of the problem implies that a comprehensive diagnosis of the
distortions is required in order to assess policies geared towards the alleviation of
identified specific distortions.  Second, this “zero-base” approach enables the detection of
important policy areas that are not being addressed by current proposals on the table.  In
particular, this approach would allow reform proposals to tackle some of the permanent
underlying impediments to financial integration that are generally taken as part of an
immutable institutional framework.  Recent financial crises and their associated
intellectual crises among economists open the doors to ambitious new architectural plans
to tackle some of the hard issues of external finance for development.  If the new
architectural design does not address structural problems and lay new foundations, it will
be no more than interior decoration.
In what follows, we review the Theories of Too Much, the Theories of Too Little,
and the Theories of Too Volatile.  We then discuss their relevance in light of the
evidence.
Theories of Too Much
Theories of Too Much usually assume that moral hazard encourages excessive lending.
3
Somebody is providing an implicit guarantee so that the parties to the transaction are not
                                               
3 Excessive lending to the public sector may also be caused by political economy distortions, which may
have contributed to the debt crisis of the 1980s.  Here we focus on lending to the private sector and
therefore assume that returns pass the market test.6
internalizing all the risks.  Too much lending and too much risk-taking occur.  Resources
are also misallocated because they are apportioned to risky projects without internalizing
the costs involved.
4  Eventually, the guarantee is called and a crisis emerges.  The various
scenarios differ in the source of the implicit guarantee.
Implicit Guarantees in the Domestic Banking System
The most traditional scenario involves government guarantees of the banking system.
The same logic will apply to a corporation perceived as being “too big to fail,” but banks
remain the prime example because they play a critical role in the payments system.
Governments cannot afford to let banks simply go broke, because that would trigger a
catastrophic sequence of defaults in which otherwise solvent firms go bust when their
clients are unable to make payments from deposits frozen in problem banking
institutions.  Counting on the protection provided by an inevitable government bailout,
bankers may assume too much risk.
The lower a bank’s capital is, the more extreme its behavior.  If a bank is very
highly capitalized, it will pay its losses with its equity.  When the bank has no more
capital, it will be tempted to adopt a strategy known as “gambling for redemption” in
which depositors or the government will pay for any additional losses while the banker
retains any upside potential for risky investments.
The standard solution to this problem is to impose, through regulation, a capital
adequacy requirement and to check that it is being met.  Since capital is the difference
between many assets and many liabilities, proper valuation of each asset and liability is
critical.  Hence, accounting standards are also central to this strategy.
The cautionary tale of moral hazard in a national banking system can become
international when domestic banks borrow abroad.  Since financial liberalization may
exacerbate the problem, some would argue for restrictions on foreign borrowing by banks
or for other forms of capital control until financial regulation and supervision is
upgraded.  We would argue that the principles of prudential regulation and supervision
should be applied to international financial transactions, just as they apply to domestic
intermediation.  In particular, liquidity requirements may be imposed on the foreign
borrowing of banks for the same reasons they are applied on domestic liabilities.  This
has become an increasingly common practice in the region.
A variation of the theory of moral hazard views pegged exchange rates as an
implicit guarantee (Mishkin, 1996, Obstfeld, 1998 and Buiter and Sibert 1999).  This
form of moral hazard would reduce incentives for hedging exposure to exchange rate risk
and would favor short-term foreign debt, which falls due in the period in which the
guarantee would be more credible.
                                               
4 Dooley (1997), Krugman (1998), and Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998) provide formal models of this
intuition.7
Implicit International Guarantees
Another Theory of Too Much follows similar lines but blames the International Monetary
Fund, bilateral creditors, and multilateral development banks for providing rescue
packages that shield either foreign investors or governments from the fallout of excessive
risk-taking.  This kind of moral hazard is thought to lead to excessive lending by foreign
investors who expect to be repaid from resources provided through future rescue
packages if real returns on investment do not materialize.  Even if it is true that official
rescue packages are quickly repaid, as is the experience so far, and do not provide a
subsidy directly responsible for creating moral hazard, they would still make it possible
for the government to extend a moral hazard-inducing bailout (an “enabler” of moral
hazard, according to DeLong, 1999).
Advocates of this explanation propose eliminating rescue packages from the
arsenal of international financial institutions.  This theory has received much currency,
especially among economists (see Sachs, 1998 and Eichenbaum et al., 1999).  Just as
with nursery rhymes, its closure is reassuringly simplistic: The world would be a better
place if not for these public sector interventions.
Theories of Too Little
For all the impressive growth in capital flows to emerging markets, they are surprisingly
low relative to what one would expect given the dominant trade theories and the way
open economies are usually modeled.  In fact, current capital flows are low compared to
those observed prior to World War I and, more recently, to those in some particularly
telling countries.  In this section, we will review crisis scenarios based on commitment
problems both at the national and international level.
Commitment Problems at the National Level
It is useful to start by focussing on problems of willingness to pay when the enforcement
of financial contacts is limited.  Loans are not self-enforcing contracts. After receiving a
loan, only coercion or the promise of future loans makes people want to fulfill their
obligations.   In order to compensate for the risk, higher charges are made.  But higher
interest rates further increase repayment problems by eroding the borrower’s ability and
willingness to repay in full and by worsening risk through adverse selection in the pool of
borrowers and moral hazard in the choice of projects (see Stiglitz and Weiss 1984).
In order to address willingness-to-pay problems, loans are often secured by
collateral, and courts adjudicate problems that arise during the life of the contract. In the
simplest example, Mary lends John money to buy a house worth 100 quarks.  The loan is
for 80 quarks and the house is the collateral.  So long as the value of the house minus the
judicial costs of repossession exceed 80 quarks, John will always be willing to repay,
because he would lose more by not paying.  The availability of assets with good titles and
with liquid secondary markets that can act as collateral and the judicial costs of
repossession are therefore important determinants of the ability of financial systems to8
address willingness-to pay problems. 
5   If the contract environment is not adequate and
judicial enforcement is weak, borrowers may not want to repay, discouraging creditors
from lending and leaving the credit market inefficiently small.
6
When nonpayment occurs or is possible, bankruptcy procedures are set in motion.
These allow ability-to-pay problems to be separated from willingness-to-pay problems.
They also provide a mechanism to secure the cooperation of the different creditors, to
remove management if creditors find it necessary, and to transfer the ownership of assets
to creditors.
7
Absence of an adequate bankruptcy law and court system can have deleterious
effects on the financial system.  It makes coercion less credible, worsening the
willingness-to-pay problem.  It also increases the cost of crises because it precludes
concerted action to provide additional financing needed for the company’s survival.  This
increases the social costs associated with bankruptcies and makes too-big-to-fail
arguments relevant even for relatively small firms.  This may prompt governments into
providing rescue packages to the corporate sector, which has traditionally been the case
in Latin America’s public enterprises, and which recently occurred in East Asia.
Bankruptcy law and the court system are important areas of domestic financial
policy in which the region is still far from where it could be.
Sovereign Risk
The previous enforcement problems affect both national and international investment.
However, in cross-border finance, the willingness-to-pay problem is severely aggravated
by the involvement of a sovereign government.  Since sovereigns do not need to abide by
the rulings of any foreign court, the problem may be serious and difficult to resolve.
Sovereign risk may explain why cross-border lending is so small.  In the standard model
(Bulow and Rogoff ,1989) sovereigns will pay so long as it is not in their interest not to
do so, given the “punishment” they may receive for nonpayment.  However, the incentive
not to pay goes up with the volume of debt owed.  This theory, originally developed for
public debt, can be extended to apply to private sector borrowing under the “protection”
of the sovereign, which may suspend convertibility, nationalize assets, or otherwise
interfere in the payment process if such action is perceived as increasing national welfare.
                                               
5 Notice that it is important for the collateral to have a liquid market.  If it does not, the threat of
repossession is unlikely to be credible.  A banker will not want to repossess a widget-making machine from
a borrower if not much can be redeemed for it.  It is better to leave the asset with the borrower, who can at
least generate some cash flow from it.  We will study other effects of illiquid markets in the next section.
6 This problem is discussed in the domestic context in IDB (1998, Chapter 7).  Japelli and Pagano (1998)
present evidence of how the behavior of institutions that affect willingness to pay have impacted credit
markets for a selection of mainly Latin American and European countries.
7 La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1998) provide an empirical analysis of creditor and shareholder rights for
a large set of countries and establish their importance as determinants of the level of development of
financial systems.9
As a result, sovereign risk augments overall risk beyond the traditional
commercial risk, and therefore, in the absence of financial enhancements, puts a floor
under private risk.  Sovereign risk will cause markets to impose a credit ceiling on
countries so as to keep the volume of aggregate debt below the level that would create
incentives for nonrepayment.  The lighter the “punishment” the world can impose on the
country, the lower the credit ceiling will be.  Economies that are more integrated into the
world are more easily “punished” and hence should get a higher credit ceiling.
The credit ceiling itself may be a source of crisis.  First, the determinants of that
credit ceiling might change, perhaps because of a deterioration in the country’s terms of
trade, causing the current debt level to exceed the ceiling and triggering a sudden stop in
new lending.  Second, even if the credit ceiling does not move, it may be destabilizing.
As discussed in Fernandez-Arias and Lombardo (1998), an externality exists since the
ceiling applies to the country as a whole but borrowing is decentralized.  Every borrower
will have incentives to get his or her loan before a neighbor does, prompting temporary
overborrowing followed by crisis.
Sovereign risk helps explain the experience of some economies that are fortunate
“outliers” in the history of international capital flows.  A first example is Puerto Rico,
where capital flows averaged about 15 percent of GDP between 1960 and 1994 and
where payments to foreign capital account for 32 percent of GDP (see Hausmann, 1996).
These numbers are striking since crises have been touched off elsewhere long before
capital flows reached these magnitudes.  For example, in 1982 and again in 1994, crisis
erupted in Mexico when the current account reached 7 to 8 percent of GDP and when
payments to foreign capital were less than 7 percent of GDP.  Puerto Rico’s peculiar
political structure implies that it does not have a sovereign to restrict payments or
suspend convertibility, thus eliminating sovereign risk.  The other two exceptions are
Australia and Ireland at the turn of the century.
Clearly, we are not proposing Puerto Rico as a political model.  We are only using
it to illustrate the magnitude of potential effects of sovereign risk on the volume of capital
flows.  These “outliers” in the history of capital flows all had peculiar political structures
that significantly limited or eliminated sovereign risk.  They also used the same currency
of the country that constituted the principal source of capital, a point we shall return to
below.
Notice that sovereign risk is a commitment problem.  If the sovereign could
somehow tie its hands and mandate future payments irrespective of future conditions
(including a change in ruling faction), the problem would disappear.  Lending would be
more ample and stable.  Yet even when the sovereign might well be better off making
such a commitment, the binding technology to make the pledge credible once
indebtedness is high may be difficult to find.
From this point of view, multilateral development banks such as the World Bank
and the Inter-American Development Bank have something to offer.  By charter, their
policy requires them to suspend operations in countries that run into arrears.  Since they10
are a cheap source of future credit and are committed to stop lending in case of arrears,
sovereigns have always repaid, giving these multilateral institutions their preferred
creditor status.  In a world where such binding devices are scarce, it may make sense for
these institutions to expand the use of their technology for improving commitment, e.g.,
through guarantees.
Thus far, private markets have tried to insulate themselves from sovereign risk
with relatively rigid contracts without clauses that could be exploited to justify
nonpayment in legalistic ways.  Yet a scheme like this, tailored to a pure willingness-to-
pay problem, may make crises triggered by a reduction in ability-to-pay more difficult to
manage and more costly.  The contracts usually make debt workouts quite messy.
The current trend toward private sector involvement in financial crises, also
known as burden sharing, is generally proposed as a way to limit moral hazard. However,
to the degree to which it makes it easier or more acceptable for countries not to repay,
burden sharing will aggravate sovereign risk and cause an inefficient reduction in the
flow of capital across borders.
Theories of Too Volatile
Financial terms and volumes of external financing are extremely volatile in Latin
America.  Figure 1 illustrates this volatility in terms of the average risk spreads of
sovereign bonds in the region over the past five years.  Spreads reached extremely high
values after the Mexican and the Russian crises, enough to compensate a 50% default
rate, at which point countries lost access to credit. This price evolution is accompanied by
an extremely volatile evolution in the level of capital inflows to the region, illustrated in
Figure 2.11
Figure 1
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Markets, moreover, did not predict the Tequila or East Asian crises.  In fact, most
of these economies appeared quite strong by conventional measures, certainly stronger
than some countries spared from crisis (see Calvo and Fernández-Arias, 1998).  This
surprise translated into a growing professional consensus that we were witnessing a new
phenomenon, one in which there was ample room for the mood of expectations in the
financial sphere to shape fundamentals and ultimately prevail.
8  International financial
turmoil after the Russian crisis severely affected Latin America, with which it had very
little fundamental linkage. This further reinforced the idea that the international financial
system was too moody to be relied upon.  Market panics, herd behavior and financial
contagion are some of the labels used to describe this new phenomenon in international
financial markets.
In what follows we lay out some of the underlying theories behind market
volatility.  Nevertheless, it should be said from the outset that the anticipation of
volatility, i.e., risk of financial turmoil, is in itself an explanation of why capital flows are
too small.  In this sense, the Theories of Too Volatile can be regarded as a special chapter
of the Theories of Too Little.
Liquidity Crises
The traditional example of liquidity crises is a bank run.  Banks typically have a term
mismatch: They receive short-term deposits, even sight deposits, and lend them at longer
maturities.  Assume all borrowers are doing just fine.  If there is no attack, the bank will
do just great.  But if suddenly depositors all want their money at the same time, the bank
will go bust.  In fact, in the bank’s attempts to collect loans too quickly, even solvent
borrowers may get into trouble due to the credit crunch.  Hence, expectations may be
self-fulfilling: both optimism and pessimism can be justified ex post.
 
The traditional solution is to have a lender of last resort willing and able to
provide liquidity on demand from fundamentally solvent banks made victims of runs.  In
this connection, a central problem may be that the globalization of financial flows has
overwhelmed the capacity of national central banks in emerging countries to credibly
provide enough last resort lending to prevent liquidity crises.
More generally, capital account imbalances, especially in the presence of high
levels of debt, raise the specter of bank-run-like payments crises if market financing dries
up, whether or not an actual banking crisis develops.  This market reaction may be based
on a loss of confidence in a particular country or simply reflect global financial contagion
(to be analyzed below).  In fact, a temporary disruption in financial flows, due to a
prolonged bout of contagion, for example, may cause enough real damage to generate a
full-blown crisis.  Countries may thus be subject to situations in which the roll-over of
public debt is subject to multiple equilibria where, in the bad outcome, creditors will
                                               
8 In fact, the interpretation of the Tequila crisis as the manifestation of a bad equilibrium in a multiple
equilibrium situation  (first advanced in Calvo, 1995) found limited echo in the profession.  East Asian
crises brought multiple equilibrium theories to the mainstream because most economists thought that
traditional explanations did not suffice, including Paul Krugman who finally shared this viewpoint in
Krugman, 1999.13
refuse to refinance debts, provoking a grave short-term liquidity problem.  The ensuing
credit crunch can cause a serious contraction, high real interest rates, and payments
problems in the corporate sector, thereby deteriorating the health of the financial system
and justifying the attack.
Furthermore, the pressure on the exchange rate caused by the capital account
shock may lead to devaluation, further contributing to the deterioration of the economic
segments with net foreign currency exposure.  In fact, currency devaluation alone may
generate multiple equilibrium and a liquidity-like crisis (see for example Fernández-Arias
and Lombardo, 1998b, Chang and Velasco, 1998, and Krugman, 1999.
Liquidity crises and solvency crises cannot be distinguished by their
consequences: both manifest in crises.  However, they differ in principle in two key
respects.  First, liquidity crises are not easily forecast because they arise from a
movement to a bad equilibrium that is neither necessary nor inevitable.  Second, liquidity
crises are preventable with sufficient financing. Since in liquidity crises the financial
interruption is not justified—with adequate financing the economy would be perfectly
capable of servicing its debts—then these types of crises must be considered unnecessary
and a strong effort should be made to prevent them through the provision of finance.  The
same holds true for financial contagion. By contrast, additional funds injected into a
solvency crisis would only postpone the moment of reckoning.
International Financial Contagion
There is a growing consensus that the main inter-country linkages underlying the high
degree of correlation among international financial prices in emerging markets are not
related to world market conditions, trade relations among them, or other traditional
transmission mechanism. Instead, they share a common set of investment institutions
making joint investment decisions (Fernández-Arias and  Rigobón 1998).  This
remarkable correlation is illustrated in Figure 3 for the evolution of bond prices in Latin
America and other emerging markets over the past five years.14
Figure 3



















































































































































































































Source: J.P.Morgan Embi+ Index
This phenomenon, termed financial contagion, is especially worrisome at the time
of large negative shocks triggered by exogenous events. The most notable example is the
collapse of bond prices in Latin America following the Russian default of August 1998, a
country with whom our region has very little economic ties.  The corresponding jump in
risk spreads and the drying up of external financing for an extended period of time denied
the region the possibility of financing a series of temporary negative exogenous shocks to
terms of trade and production.  Foreign capital not only proved unreliable, but also
actually imposed a severe liquidity squeeze relative to normal levels that led to the
recession from which the region is recovering only now (Figure 4).15
Figure 4












The possibility of financial contagion makes financial integration unreliable.  To a
large extent, financial contagion is akin to a liquidity crisis in slow motion, whose
ultimate outcome depends on whether the speed of recovery is enough to pull out the
economy.   It is true that the market discriminates, in the sense that relative valuations in
periods of contagion are consistent with the strength of fundamentals (as measured by
prior market spreads; see Fernandez-Arias and Rigobón, 1998), which puts some of the
volatility under the control of the policymaker.  In fact, as shown in Figure 5, market
relative valuations were preserved during the period.  Furthermore, countries can try to
prepare themselves to withstand contagion while it lasts.  Nonetheless, absolute
valuations in countries with strong fundamentals suddenly collapsed in ways that
constitute a worrisome puzzle.16
Figure 5





























































































































































































































































One important explanation advanced to account for the evidence is that
investment institutions were hit by big losses in crisis countries (e.g., Russia) and became
capital deficient to back their obligations (fulfill margin calls) and not creditworthy
themselves, which forced them to shrink their portfolio and reduce risk bearing.  The
result was the kind of portfolio reallocation observed in practice.  Because of the
illiquidity of this market, perhaps because non-specialized buyers are less informed than
specialized sellers (see Calvo 1998), this reallocation requires fire-sale prices.  The strong
contagion in Latin America would be due to the fact that most of our investors are within
a narrow field of institutions specializing in non-investment grade paper. In this sense,
financial regulations in industrial countries, by prohibiting very large institutional
investors from holding non-investment grade assets, may have caused the inefficient
segmenting of the market and drastically reduced its liquidity.
It is useful to reflect on the fact that illiquidity is crucial for contagion.  In this
case the imbalance between sellers and buyers stems from the fact that there is a common
shock affecting all specialized agents, which calls for liquidity support and/or regulatory
forbearance to smooth the shock.  More generally, the lack of liquidity of asset markets is
usually a major contributing factor to liquidity crises.  One important example is the
market for asset collateral.  If such markets are liquid, then in times of crisis a firm
should be able to find someone willing to provide a collateralized (i.e., practically risk-
free) loan.  However, if the market for the asset is not liquid, then its use as collateral is
severely limited.  One important factor is the presence of large aggregate shocks to the
economy, which by hitting most agents in a similar fashion tends to make the market17
unbalanced and hence illiquid.  Agents are either all trying to buy or to sell, but since
agents on both sides are needed to make a market, then very few transactions will take
place and asset prices are likely to be very volatile, hence not very useful as collateral.  In
particular, falling asset prices during generalized downturns facilitate the occurrence of
liquidity crises by reducing the amount of collateral.
A key implication is that bond spreads under contagion do not reflect country risk.
Prices are misaligned, but arbitrage opportunities are not exploited because specialized,
informed investors are capital constrained.  Over time, the pricing gap would be
arbitraged as the constraints over our specialized  investors ease and new financial
intermediaries are established.  Therefore, lack of liquidity resulting from contagion
would be temporary, a prediction that also bodes well with the evidence.  International
policies of temporary support suggest themselves.
Original Sin
Many of the problems discussed so far are related to or aggravated by a characteristic of
almost all emerging market currencies: they cannot be used to borrow abroad and cannot
be used even domestically to borrow long term. This fundamental incompleteness of the
financial market has been called original sin (Hausmann, 1999,  Eichengreen and
Hausmann, 1999).
From the point of view of this definition, all emerging market currencies suffer
from original sin. Essentially, all foreign debt is denominated in foreign currency. With
the partial exception of Chile, there is no single country in Latin America with a liquid
market for long-term bonds denominated in the domestic currency.  Long-term debt, to
the extent that it exists, is issued in dollars, with the exception of Chile, the only country
where there is a liquid long-term bond market in a price index.
These two characteristics are accompanied in many countries by a large de facto
dollarization of assets in the domestic banking system. In Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador,
Peru and Uruguay dollar liabilities account for well over half of the deposits of the
banking system.
Original sin has important implications for financial fragility. It will cause
investments to be financed either in dollars or short term. If the funding is done in dollars,
many projects will have a currency mismatch, as cash flows would be denominated in a
different currency from that of the debt. If companies try to avoid this problem by
borrowing in pesos, they will have a maturity mismatch as only short-term loans are
available in the domestic market. Hence, maturity and currency mismatches are endemic
in countries with original sin.
Currency mismatches cannot be reduced, to any significant extent, through
hedging in countries with original sin. This is so because external debt is in foreign
currency, which in turn reflects foreigners’ unwillingness to be long in the domestic
currency. With imports more or less hedging exports, nothing is left to hedge the net18
external debt. If hedging were possible (i.e., a feasible market existed), international
banks would offer peso loans and then hedge away their currency risk. After all, a peso
loan is just a dollar loan plus a hedge. If hedging were possible we would see much more
lending by major banks in local currency. The fact that this does not happen is an
indication of the seriousness of this constraint
This is important because it has been argued that floating exchange rates would
reduce the incentives to leave unhedged foreign currency positions and thus limit the
moral hazard in international borrowing. But if hedging is limited by original sin, then
floating will reduce unhedged dollar borrowing by simply reducing dollar borrowings
both domestically and internationally, leading to less investment and growth.
The currency and maturity mismatches interact through monetary policy, making
the Central Bank’s choices much riskier. When there is pressure on the exchange rate, the
monetary authority may let the currency depreciate, but this will cause serious balance
sheet problems in those firms with currency mismatches. The reduction in net worth may
limit their ability to pay both foreign and domestic obligations. Alternatively, the Central
Bank may defend the exchange rate through non-sterilized intervention or by otherwise
tightening monetary conditions, but this would make it difficult for those with maturity
mismatches to roll over their short-term debt. Either way, the system may end up in a
banking or currency crisis.
9
This may be one reason why developing countries hold such high reserve levels in
comparison to more developed countries. But avoiding this problem by holding sufficient
reserves means essentially foregoing the importation of capital (in net terms).  Similarly,
restricting or taxing foreign investors that lend in foreign-currency would amount to
taxing capital inflows, reducing financial integration by increasing the domestic cost of
capital.
10  This helps account for the puzzle of too-little financing.
It is important in this context to ask what would happen to financial turmoil if
countries were to abandon their weak domestic currencies in favor of a strong
supranational currency.
11  One would expect the sudden elimination of significant
currency and maturity mismatches throughout the balance sheets of households and firms
in the economy to facilitate financial integration and lead to safer, deeper markets.  As
mentioned before, evidence supporting this hypothesis comes from the fact that capital
flows were proportionally much higher prior to World War I than any time afterward.
One explanation for this was the existence of a global currency system: the gold standard.
Likewise, Panama, which uses the U.S. dollar, has the deepest domestic credit market and
is the only country in Latin America where the financial system offers 30-year mortgages
and it does so at less than 9 percent interest.
                                               
9 This dilemma is at the root of the contradictory criticisms that IMF exchange rate policy advice in crisis
countries has received, some for endorsing currency depreciation (e.g., Wall Street Journal, 1998a and
1998b) and some for defending the currency with high interest rates (e.g., Sachs, 1998).
10 This proposal has recently been advanced by Anne Krueger.
11 This issue is specifically addressed in the paper “Exchange Rate Arrangements for the New
Architecture” (Hausmann, 1999).19
Original sin may be caused in part by sovereign risk. If a capital importing
country could borrow in its own currency, it would be able to improve its net worth by
letting the currency depreciate. In anticipation of this risk, lenders would demand a
higher rate of return, but this would trigger an adverse selection process as the only ones
willing to pay such a premium would be those planning to devalue. Hence, the market
could easily disappear. How is it, then, that some countries are able to borrow abroad in
their own currency?
One hypothesis is that the government would not be expected to let the currency
depreciate if a broad cross-section of domestic residents holds much of the public debt. In
that case, the median voter will be close to the median debt holder and it will not be
politically expedient to devalue in order to dilute the real value of the domestic currency
debt. If instead, much of the public debt is held by few voters, or even worse, by non-
voting foreigners, then it will be hard for the government to establish credibility in its
willingness to forego the benefits of devaluation. This means that original sin may have
deep political economy causes that are unlikely to be reversed through pure and costly
perseverance. A social security reform with the development of private pension funds
may permit a better alignment of the interests of the median voter with those of foreign
investors and thus give credibility to peso-denominated debt.
Confronting the Evidence
It is well known that capital flows to developing countries are smaller than desirable
under any reasonable standard.  Taking into account the existing differences in
capital/labor ratios, international flows across nations are way too small relative to flows
within nations (Bayoumi and Rose, 1993 and Bayoumi, 1997), which explains the strong
correlation between domestic savings and investment first uncovered by Feldstein and
Horioka (1980).  This piece of evidence implies that Theories of Too  Much do not
address the most important distortions present in the world. Hence, policy
recommendations predicated on them, without reference to their impact on the other more
important distortions, cannot be presumed to be welfare enhancing.  At the same time,
this evidence supports the Theories of Too Little and, indirectly, the Theories of Too
Volatile.
The magnitude of capital flows under the Gold Standard, before World War I,
clearly shows that international flows can be much larger than today.  In fact, the
correlation between domestic savings and investment is much weaker in that period, on
the order of 40% relative to 80% after World War II.  Whether large flows were due to
the international monetary arrangement or to limited sovereignty of the main borrowers
relative to the major capital exporting center is an open question. However, the case of
Argentina, a country that received massive flows without having special political ties to
the United Kingdom, supports the view that the monetary arrangement was a critical
ingredient.20
As DeLong (1999) points out, the historical record of large flows in the Gold
Standard period can also be interpreted as direct evidence against the moral hazard view.
First, in that period there was no IMF or functional equivalent to create international
moral hazard in developing countries, and yet flows were larger.  And second, financial
crises then were even more frequent and deep; the IMF is certainly not a requisite for
crises!
Theories of Too Much imply that capital flows would be skewed in favor of the
type of flows more likely to be covered by guarantees, as Eichengreen and Hausmann
(1999) point out.  Borrowing by banks and government borrowings would appear at the
top of the list.  Also, the moral hazard involved in currency risk would justify the
skewing of these flows toward the short term. But the evidence from international banks
that report to the BIS is that their cross-border lending to developing countries shows no
evidence of these distortions (see Table 1). The pattern of lending to emerging markets
by BIS-reporting banks is less short term, less inter-bank and more non-bank than lending
to other industrial countries. Hence, by the standards of developed countries, there is no
evidence that BIS-reporting banks skew their flows to exploit moral hazard.Table 1 Structure of Debt Owed to BIS Reporting Banks 1998 (%)
Banks Gov't Nonbanks Short-term Long-term
ALL COUNTRIES 35.34 14.34 49.51 52.43 47.57
DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES
39.60 13.83 46.30 54.19 45.81
     Australia 41.72 7.18 50.86 55.03 44.97
     Portugal 59.84 8.08 31.66 65.87 34.13
EASTERN EUROPE 44.83 14.43 40.52 49.07 50.93
     Czech Republic 53.87 6.09 39.82 56.15 43.85
     Poland 35.79 22.78 41.23 42.92 57.08
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 31.76 14.91 53.20 54.58 45.42
LATIN AMERICA 23.71 20.13 55.90 55.22 44.78
     Argentina 18.19 19.34 62.45 57.38 42.62
     Brazil 31.34 17.48 51.01 63.12 36.88
     Chile 15.08 7.06 77.38 45.51 54.49
     Colombia 25.63 20.93 53.44 39.06 60.94
     Mexico 18.64 29.22 52.04 44.81 55.19
     Peru 34.23 5.51 60.26 77.31 22.69
     Venezuela 10.27 40.77 48.89 39.81 60.19
ASIA 37.00 9.04 53.90 53.03 46.97
     Indonesia 13.69 15.65 70.66 54.07 45.93
     Korea South 56.57 6.75 36.58 45.08 54.92
     Malaysia 30.79 6.62 62.47 48.21 51.79
     Philippines 45.05 12.61 42.31 56.39 43.61
     Thailand 26.09 4.29 69.60 59.26 40.74
     Hong Kong 53.70 0.72 45.01 75.23 24.77
Source: BIS Consolidated International Banking Statistics.
From    Eichengreen and Hausmann, (1999)22
Moreover, portfolio flows rather than international commercial banks have been
the key players in this decade. The massive losses stock and bondholders have been
subject to and the enormous political costs paid by governments in crisis countries make
it hard to imagine that moral hazard alone could create such widespread financial havoc.
Therefore, there is strong evidence that moral hazard is not the dominant
distortion in international finance to developing countries.   The same holds true in the
context of impediments to economic development.  Even if moral hazard is a piece of the
explanation of the East Asian crises, the fact that these countries have the most successful
sustained growth record in known history is countervailing evidence that should make us
pause.  Radical institutional reform of a financial system recently regarded as a
development model in the name of moral hazard appears premature given the current
state of knowledge (see Feldstein, 1998).
Concerning Latin America, our region has made very significant progress in
improving banking supervision and regulation,
12 especially after the Tequila crisis in
1995.  During the past two years, Latin American banks withstood quite well a very
adverse environment given the Asian and Russian financial shocks, the decline in the
terms of trade, and the effects of El Niño and of hurricanes Georges and Mitch.
Domestic banks have been able to weather these storms without generating a banking
crisis in any of the major economies of the region.  Despite this performance, financial
turmoil has been at a peak and access to world capital markets has been closed for long
stretches.
What Went Wrong in Recent Experiences?
To unearth the causes of financial turmoil, it is important to review the salient features of
recent crises.  Starting with the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995, financial turmoil in
emerging countries has puzzled analysts of all stripes.  Surprise is perhaps the most
striking feature of recent crises.  A graphic way to view this is presented in Calvo and
Fernández-Arias (1998).  There, the six crisis countries of 1997-1998 (Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Russia, and Thailand) are compared with the six largest
countries in our region (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela).  If
we classify these countries into low and high risk according to market risk spreads and
ratings in mid-1997, right before the crises, we find that, except for Russia, crises
occurred in the low-risk countries.
Some crisis narratives attribute this lack of predictability to the fact that crises
have come in a variety of flavors, each triggered by yet-to-be-discovered factors.  In fact,
many of these “flavors” have been quite novel.  The Mexican Tequila crisis of 1994-1995
came as a surprise because the key causal factor of the 1982 debt crisis–namely a high
fiscal deficit–was not an issue.  Eventually, many analysts came to blame a large current
account deficit and low savings for Mexico’s crisis, but neither of these would play a role
in the Asian crises that followed a few years later.  Furthermore, the Asian crises would
                                               
12 See IDB (1997) for a country-by-country assessment of how much progress has taken place and for an
analysis of its contribution to growth in the region.23
differ among themselves; for example, some involved banking problems, while others did
not. None involved significant exchange rate misalignments, and Korea had only a very
small current account deficit. Then the Russian episode changed the pattern of the
kaleidoscope again, returning to a traditional script for a public debt crisis.
We are more persuaded by the argument that lack of predictability is largely
rooted in problems of multiple equilibria rather than in a misunderstanding of the
workings of economies.  This means that the existence of a potentially “bad” equilibrium
may trigger a self-fulfilling financial panic in which the collapse validates the state of
panic that causes it.  These problems resemble bank runs and are associated with liquidity
problems.  They are particularly likely in countries that suffer from original sin, as all the
crisis countries did. In some of the recent crises, fundamentals were consistent with the
required capacity to service the debt load, but a sudden lack of liquidity severely
damaged the economy, leading to an unexpected change in sentiment.  The unnecessary
nature of the run that provoked the liquidity crunch can account for the failure of the
market to anticipate the crisis.
And most puzzling of all–and this is very important–the strong financial
contagion associated with these crises infected countries enjoying strong fundamentals
that had essentially no economic linkages with crisis countries.  This was most notably so
in Latin America during the Russian crisis.  Most emerging markets in the world have
lost much of their access to external financing, even though their economies do not
present any great inherent weaknesses.   Recent experience with financial contagion
points to the importance of addressing distortions of the international financial system
that lie beyond policy reform in emerging countries.
We shall keep in mind some of these features when discussing the degree of
relevance of different theories about “what is wrong in the world” and, consequently,
how to fix it.
We shall also keep in mind the severe limitations of policy instruments in
stopping a crisis once it has started, which puts a premium on prevention strategies.
Once a crisis breaks out, the experience shows that it quickly develops into a meltdown
with enormous output losses, even if rescue packages are quickly dished out.  This may
occur because, in developing countries, financial markets are incomplete and contracts
hard to enforce.  Experience suggests that such strategies are insufficient either to avoid
enormous damage to the well-being of the countries involved or to prevent the contagion
from spreading internationally.  Crisis resolution based on official rescue packages,
moreover, is fraught with difficulties.  First, once a crisis breaks out, the economic
fundamentals swiftly deteriorate and contagion propagates in ways that are not easy to
reverse or repair.  Second, the emergency nature of the situation produces support
packages that tend to be uncertain. Moreover, the tranched and conditioned nature of the
disbursements do not reverse the run by private sector creditors to the bad equilibrium.
Third, for the same reason it is very difficult to implement effective private sector
participation in a way that is not involuntary and counterproductive.24
What Is Wrong?
The analysis just presented suggests that serious distortions are present in
international financial markets.  These are behind the fact that flows are on average small,
relative to the difference in capital-labor ratios and demographic trends in the world.
They are also behind their unusually high volatility and co-movement. While much of the
policy debate has assumed that the dominant distortion is moral hazard, the
preponderance of the evidence suggests that other distortions are more binding.
The dominant view in industrial countries, as expressed in the Report of the
Council on Foreign Relations and the G-7 Cologne communiqué, among others, is
centered on concerns of moral hazard. Hence, it puts emphasis almost single-mindedly on
measures to reduce moral hazard. Thus, it concentrates on policy initiatives such as better
regulation and supervision of domestic banks to reduce moral hazard in banking; smaller
rescue packages and more private sector involvement in them, to reduce the moral hazard
caused by bailouts; floating exchange rate regimes to reduce implicit exchange rate
guarantees that foster unhedged foreign currency borrowing. But supervision is not a
solution to problems of commitment in credit markets. The elimination of rescue
packages is likely to aggravate liquidity crises. Floating regimes in the context of original
sin are likely to reduce  unhedged foreign currency borrowing by reducing borrowing,
leading to less mobilization of resources and less growth
More broadly speaking, a single-minded focus on eliminating financial crises may
well be achieved by eliminating finance altogether. A focus on eradicating surges in
capital flows may lead to a dearth of capital mobility towards the developing world and
foregoing the benefits of financial integration at a time when demographic trends would
justify increased capital mobility. The challenge then is not just stability but stable
growth and development.25
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